A Reappraisal of the Expulsion of Illegal Immigrants from Nigeria in 1983 by Gary-Tounkara, Daouda
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives License. 
ISSN: 1864–1385
A Reappraisal of the Expulsion of Illegal Immigrants 
from Nigeria in 1983
Daouda Gary-Tounkara, CNRS, Paris, and LAM, Sciences Po, Bordeaux, France
urn:nbn:de:0070- i jcv-2015220
IJCV: Vol. 9 (1) 2015
Vol. 9 (1) 2015
Focus Section:  
Xenophobic Violence 
and the Manufacture of 
Difference in Africa
Editorial (p. 3)
Xenophobic Violence and the Manufacture of Difference in Africa: Introduction to the Focus Section  
Laurent Fourchard / Aurelia Segatti (pp. 4 – 11)
“Go Back and Tell Them Who the Real Men Are!” Gendering Our Understanding of Kibera’s Post-election 
Violence Caroline Wanjiku Kihato (pp. 12 – 24)
A Reappraisal of the Expulsion of Illegal Immigrants from Nigeria in 1983 Daouda Gary-Tounkara (pp. 25 – 38)
Collective Mobilization and the Struggle for Squatter Citizenship: Rereading “Xenophobic” Violence in a South 
African Settlement Tamlyn Jane Monson (pp. 39 – 55)
Protecting the “Most Vulnerable”? The Management of a Disaster and the Making/Unmaking of Victims after 
the 2008 Xenophobic Violence in South Africa Lydie Cabane (pp. 56 – 71)
The Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East Uriel Abulof / Ogen Goldman (pp. 72 – 89)
Group-based Compunction and Anger: Their Antecedents and Consequences in Relation to Colonial 
Conflicts Ana Figueiredo / Bertjan Doosje / Joaquim Pires Valentim (pp. 90 – 105)
The Secret Society of Torturers: The Social Shaping of Extremely Violent Behaviour  
Jürgen Mackert (pp. 106 – 120)
Validation of the Greek Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA) Scale: Examining Its 
Relationships with Sexist and Conservative Political Beliefs Alexandra Hantzi / Efthymios Lampridis / Katerina 
Tsantila / Gerd Bohner (pp. 121 – 133)
Open Section
IJCV: Vol. 9 (1) 2015, pp. 25 – 38
Daouda Gary-Tounkara: A reappraisal of the expulsion of illegal immigrants from Nigeria in 1983  26
In recent years, Nigeria has been quietly expelling more and more immigrants from Niger, Mali, Chad and Cameroon. These foreigners – migrant workers or 
small traders – face the reinforcement of migration control and the blind fight of the government against Boko Haram. Despite its political instability, Nigeria 
remains a major immigration destination in West Africa. In this article, I analyze the “undocumented” expulsion of aliens in 1983, officially three million 
people. I argue that the expulsion was due to the economic crisis but also to a nationalist revenge against Ghana and a political calculation of President Sha-
gari. This implies the exclusion of foreigners from the national labour market and the weakening of the supposed electoral base of his opponents.
In memory of Dennis D. Cordell and Diouma Gary-
Tounkara
By virtue of its exceptional historical and political trajec-
tory, Nigeria symbolises multidimensional violence also 
extending to other African societies. Since 1953 and the 
Kano riots against citizens from the Eastern Region (Albert 
1993), the country has seemed to evolve in a cycle of viol-
ence. The media analysis of its political outcomes remains 
blurred by an interpretation that lays emphasis on mobili-
sations that are regionalist, religious or ethnic in nature. The 
North/South, Muslims/Christians, Yoruba/Ibo/Hausa antag-
onisms overshadow other forms of socio-political exclusion 
that obstruct the reappraisal of internal conflicts in Nigeria 
(Falola 1998; Fourchard 2007; Higazi 2007). This was the 
issue with the expulsion of two and half million illegal 
immigrants, citizens of Chad, Cameroon and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS, or the Com-
munity) in 1983. This represents almost 3 percent of the 
country’s population (Russell and Teitelbaum 1992, 20). Yet, 
one of the objectives of ECOWAS, created in Lagos five 
years after the end of the Biafra civil war (1967–1970), was 
to prevent conflicts and to contribute to the coming 
together of different peoples for regional integration. In this 
scheme and through various protocols, member states 
agreed to liberalise the movement of people and goods as a 
means of transcending the divisions inherited from colonial 
administration. Faced with scale of protests from neigh-
bouring countries, President Shagari pointed to unfavour-
able economic conditions and popular demands:
Many such illegal immigrants were tolerated by Nigeria for 
humanitarian reasons, but it soon became clear that the activ-
ities of many of these immigrants ran counter to the national 
interest of Nigeria. Besides, the fact that many of them were tak-
ing up cheap menial jobs, to the detriment of many Nigerians, 
and also engaging in criminal and anti-social activities detri-
mental to the interest of the nation. Many were also engaged in 
smuggling Nigerian food and other goods to their home coun-
tries. It was soon discovered that most of the workers in our fac-
tories were illegal aliens. The trend was extended into many 
professions including teaching, to such an extent that within a 
short period, even the roadside mechanics, tailors and 
domestics servants were largely illegal aliens. There was public 
outcry about this alarming development and the government 
had to do something at once to control the situation (Shagari 
2001, 330).
To what extent are these affirmations tenable? How could 
one explain that, in one section of public opinion, the pur-
pose of the order to expel illegal immigrants seemed to be to 
hunt for all the foreigners living in the country, especially 
Ghanaians? Many works have explored this event and 
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pointed out, rightly, the importance of the deterioration of 
economic conditions in the president’s decision (Philippe 
1983; Gravil 1985; Falola and Ihonvbere 1985; Afolayan 
1988). This article revisits the expulsion of foreigners from 
Nigeria in 1983, examining its hitherto poorly documented 
nationalist, symbolic and identity dimensions. After the 
spectacular expulsion of its nationals from Ghana in 1969, 
Nigeria retaliated by repatriating Ghanaians in return. It is 
often overlooked that this event falls within the continuum 
of a rivalry between the two countries dating from the colo-
nial period. Because their country was modernised earlier 
socio-economically, the Ghanaian elites acquired a sense of 
superiority with regard to their Nigerian counterparts.1 
After independence, this feeling was fuelled by strong com-
petition on the African diplomatic scene, with Ghana the 
first independent sub-Saharan country proclaiming itself 
the representative of the continent on foreign affairs and 
reducing its Nigerian rival to an idol with feet of clay. To 
worsen the matter, during the Biafran war that threatened 
the very existence of Nigeria, not only did Ghana accord 
early recognition to the secession, but also did not hesitate to 
expel 140,000 Nigerians within that same period (Aluko 
1976, 227, 240). Under these conditions, I argue that the 
1983 expulsion proceeds not only from economic crisis but 
also contains elements of nationalist vengeance and a trans-
position of the rivalry between the president and his oppo-
nents from the political arena to the social sphere. By 
nationalist vengeance, I mean a symbolic triple revenge of 
Nigeria on Ghana: teach the good pupil of the former British 
West African a lesson, sanction her in retaliation for the 
1969 expulsion, and affirm the authority of a state whose 
interest in the rest of Africa was being challenged. Fur-
thermore, at the internal level, the confrontation between 
citizens and foreigners also doubled as an indirect con-
frontation between the president and the opposition because 
of the rumour that Ghanaian illegal immigrants were sup-
posedly being prepared for presidential elections scheduled 
that same year: “It was reported that Nigeria’s opposition 
parties were registering Ghanaian residents to vote for them 
in the forthcoming elections.”2 The historian Louise White 
(2000) has already shown the effects of rumour on vox 
populi in the colonial East Africa and described the 
deformed, even fantastic, image of whites that settled there. 
This analysis could be applied to the Nigerian case, where 
rumour and suspicion constitute one of the driving forces 
behind popular mobilisations. Again recently, in April 2013, 
there was a rumour in Lagos that members of Boko Haram 
were preparing bombings, aided by migrants from Chad, 
Niger or Mali (Ojo, Suberu and Murtala 2013). These collec-
tively constituted the third (albeit largely unknown) 
foreigner community in the country after Ghana and Benin, 
(Afolayan 2009, 15).3 With the public expression of xeno-
phobia changing according to period and circumstances, I 
propose to analyse the expulsion of 1983 with a double com-
parison: between the Ghanaian and Malian immigrants on 
one hand, and on the other, the mechanisms of expulsion 
using the foreigner label in Nigeria and in Côte d’Ivoire.
Adopting a socio-historical approach to the management 
of migration, this study relies mainly on fieldwork con-
ducted in Nigeria and a critical analysis of post-colonial 
archives.4 Reinserted within the context of debates on the 
use of the label “foreigners” as a resource of political legit-
imisation (Bayart, Geschiere, and Nyamnjoh 2001; Whi-
taker 2005), it reveals the differentiated handling of foreign 
communities living in Nigeria during that time, while tak-
ing into consideration their numbers and their socio-
economic positions.
1 By reason of an early start in higher education, 
professional training and the attainment of national 
independence: “The Gold Coast leaders felt superior 
to the Nigerians for three main reasons. Firstly, the 
Gold Coast had the advantage of higher education 
earlier than Nigeria. Secondly, most of the Nigerians 
trading and working in Ghana till the early fifties 
were largely uneducated and unskilled labour, and 
‘farm hands’. Thirdly, the faster rate of the decolon-
ization process in the Gold Coast, which started with 
the 1946 constitution, made its leaders feel more 
important than the Nigerians. The result of all this 
was that the Gold Coast did not want to be in any 
position subordinate to Nigeria” (Aluko 1976, 65).
2 International Herald Tribune, 4 February 1983, 
quoted by Gravil (1985, 528). “It had also been widely 
believed that some rival parties had distributed 
voter’s cards to ‘aliens’ and others were organizing 
alien-gangs to disrupt the elections or cause violence 
after elections” (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 214).
3 Afolayan quoted: Development Research Centre 
on Migration, 2007, Global Migrant Origin Database, 
Development Research Centre on Migration Global-
ization and Poverty, March, Version 4.
4 In November 2012, contact with Malians residing 
in Lagos and Ibadan was made through Lassana 
Diawara and the Council of Malians of Nigeria 
(Conseil des Maliens du Nigeria), which is a feder-
ative structure with branches in major host coun-
tries. This research was done within the framework 
of ANR research programme XenAfPol, coordinated 
by Laurent Fourchard and Aurélia Ségatti. I thank 
Rufus Akinyele, Patrick Oloko, Joseph Ayodokun, 
Ndubueze O. Nkume-Okorie, and the IFRA team at 
Ibadan for their help, assistance, and suggestions.
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1. “Aliens Must Go!” The Nightmare of “Brethren” from ECOWAS and the 
Legitimacy Crisis of the State
To understand the modalities of the expulsion of 1983, one 
ought first to explain the conditions that led to the arrival 
of migrants from ECOWAS, from Chad and from Came-
roon during the oil boom of the 1970s, which was marked 
by annual growth close to 10 percent (Falola and Ihonvbere 
1985, 83). Their presence did not receive much attention in 
public debate, even after the crisis of international overpro-
duction of oil in 1981. This was followed by a fall in price 
and a rise in urban unemployment, which affected two 
thirds of urban workers (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 98).5 
Close to the presidential election of August 1983, in order 
to hide the mismanagement of resources from oil oper-
ations, President Shagari, campaigning for reelection, tried 
to acquire a new legitimacy by accusing the illegal immi-
grants and the opposition. The politicisation of the pres-
ence of illegal immigrants reached its peak in 1983.
After the civil war, within a context of growth stimulated 
by crude oil exportation and a rise in the oil price between 
1973 and 1981 (Bach 1989, 220), migratory movement 
from the rest of West Africa towards Nigerian cities intensi-
fied. Through the pull effect, oil revenue financed and 
revitalised the development of public works and light 
industry sectors (Philippe 1989, 107–8). Consequently, the 
local labour market expanded in the area of commercial 
activities and urban services. This created professional and 
employment opportunities for migrants coming from the 
North or from the Sahel, during one or several dry seasons. 
The great drought that occurred in the Sahel in 1973 inten-
sified the influx. Many of these people lacked identity cards 
or passports, as President Shagari lamented:
The problem of illegal aliens has been with the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs from the advent of the “oil boom”, in the early 1970’s, 
when large number of immigrations from neighbouring West 
African countries started to enter the country, mostly illegally, in 
search of jobs. The drought of between 1973 and 1974; also 
brought in a new wave of refugees and destitutes, moving in 
Thanks to the rise in the oil price in 1973, Nigeria para-
doxically escaped the global economic slowdown that fol-
lowed. But from 1981 it suffered from the subsequent fall in 
the oil price caused by overproduction. This was the first 
downturn for a middle class that had been getting accus-
tomed to a favourable environment (Monnoyer and Phil-
ippe 1988, 82). The country embarked on an IMF 
Structural Adjustment Programme in 1983, with budgetary 
restrictions and unpopular cuts in social spending. Quickly, 
general discontentment arose. The social consequences of 
the structural adjustment resulted in a political crisis (Phil-
ippe 1983, 119) against the backdrop of corruption scandals 
affecting members of state institutions (Joseph 1987). 
Because of its role as an oil producer, Nigeria was soon 
exposed to a reversal of its situation: Whereas the populace 
was hoping that oil revenues would be used to improve liv-
ing conditions and fund a necessary diversification of the 
economy, instead petrodollars were used to finance an 
unproductive and clientelist system benefiting the president 
and his political allies from the National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN). Cost inflation became the rule in the attribution of 
public offers and the importation of goods (Falola and 
Ihonvbere 1985, 107–8). This added to the disarray of 
excluded businesspersons and their outsourced agents.
Public opinion could not comprehend how the state had 
missed such a good opportunity to make the country “take 
off”. On the other hand, poverty and a high cost of living 
were the daily fate of the ordinary citizen. In May 1981, at 
the insistence of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) – 
comprising 44 professional bodies – a general strike para-
lysed the whole country, notwithstanding police and judi-
cial repression (ibid., 99 and 159). In the political arena, 
mobilisations against President Shagari were organised 
simultaneously, as the opposition united under the coali-
tion of the Progressive Parties Alliance now comprised of 
5 According to the Nigerian Labour Congress, 
20,000 textile workers were fired between 1979 and 
1982, and in October 1982 alone there were 1,000 
redundancies in the chemical industry, 2,000 in the 
furniture and woodwork sector, 3,000 in the food, 
drinks and tobacco industry, and 2,000 in the petro-
leum industry (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 150).
from the Sahelian region of West Africa (Niger, Mali, Chad, 
Mauritania, and many others), into Nigeria (Shagari 2001, 330).
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the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) of Chief Obafemi Awo-
lowo, the Great Nigerian People’s Party (GNPP) of Alhaji 
Shugaba Darman and the National People’s Party (NPP) of 
Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe (ibid., 75). On the eve of a rather chall-
enging electoral period, the president had lost all legitimacy 
and his chances of being re-elected were compromised by 
growing social inequalities and a determined opposition. 
What followed was a deleterious election where the govern-
ment used all available resources (financial, judicial, media) 
to disqualify the leaders of the Progressive Parties Alliance.
The decision to collectively expel an estimated three mil-
lion illegal aliens occurred within this chaotic pre-electoral 
context. On 17 January 1983, President Shagari announced 
that all foreigners residing illegally in the country were 
being asked to either leave or get administratively regula-
rised within two weeks, extended to a month for the more 
qualified like secretaries and nurses (Afolayan 1988, 20). By 
expelling foreigners, the objective was to reduce unem-
ployment among Nigerian citizens and to stifle a major 
source of smuggling and criminality. The targeted 
foreigners were those engaged in informal professional 
activities without working permits and unlicenced traders. 
These groups were in in fact engaged in unfair competition 
with unemployed Nigerians (Afolayan 1988, 18). Beggars 
and prostitutes were in a different category of foreigners. It 
is common knowledge that in countries experiencing 
immigration and having difficulties dealing with crisis and 
unemployment, some political leaders try to scapegoat 
foreigners and tighten conditions of residence. This is a 
means of acquiring legitimacy, as observed in Côte d’Ivoire 
(Marshall-Fratani 2006). Nigeria is no exception. Accord-
ing to the president, foreigners had abused the hospitality 
of Nigerians, and were urged to go back to their countries 
(Shagari 2001, 333).
The government relied on its own legislation and that of 
the new Community. The people targeted by the expulsion 
order had violated the provisions on residence under the 
1963 law and under the terms of the Community, which 
require individuals to regularise their administrative situ-
ation when their stay in a member state extends beyond 
three months (Afolayan 1988, 18). In reality, the govern-
ment contributed to transforming the expulsion operation 
into a disorganised and chaotic enterprise. All foreigners, 
including those that were already regularised, were asked to 
visit the immigration service at their place of residence. In 
a press release, the Ogun state immigration office asked for 
three passport photographs, a copy of the residence permit, 
and an attestation from the employer.
A press release in Ogun state about the order of registration of the citizens of ECOWAS, Cameroon and Chad6
The Immigration Department in Ogun State has appealed to 
aliens from ECOWAS countries, Republics of Chad and Came-
roun living in the state legally to show up and register.
A statement by the department in Abeokuta announced that 
registration had commenced throughout the state, and that reg-
istration centres were at the state headquarters of Immigration 
Department at 58B Oko-IIewo, in Abeokuta and other immi-
gration control posts in the state.
Among other registration centres, according to the announce-
ment, were Idi-Iroko, Ifon-yintedo, Ijoffin and Imeko towns.
All aliens who entered and lived in Nigeria prior to the coming 
into force of the immigration Act of 1963 and all aliens holding 
valid residence permits were required to register, the statement 
said.
The applicants are expected to bring along three passport size 
photographs, original copy of residence permit and a letter of 
introduction from their employer, in respect of those who are 
employees in private or public sectors.
The statement emphasised that aliens affected and who were 
employed in the public sector, would only be registered after 
having their stay in Nigeria regularised.
It called the employers of aliens to apply for regularisation on 
behalf of their employees, and announced that the registration 
exercise would be a continuous one.
6 “Register Now, Aliens Urged”, Daily Times, Feb-
ruary 16, 1983.
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In the public perception, this directive contributed to creat-
ing confusion between legal and illegal foreigners, including 
the refugees whereas the central government was targeting 
the undocumented. Amidst growing confusion, the govern-
ment felt compelled to specify that Ghanaian and Chadian 
political refugees were exempted from the order of expul-
sion.7 Besides, the government seemed not to have con-
sidered the technical and organisational means required for 
gathering, feeding and transporting an estimated three mil-
lion deportees. It had Ghanaians conveyed on regular flights 
of Karbo Airlines, Inter-Continental Airlines, Ghana Air-
ways, Swissair, KLM, Air India and Nigeria Airlines. Never-
theless, that was not enough: “hundreds of illegal aliens 
[were] stranded at the transit camp and the departure hall of 
the airport”.8 In 1970, Côte d’Ivoire had also expelled poor 
and handicapped migrants on special flights (Gary-Tounkara 
2008, 243). According to the president, the government 
released one million dollars to assist the home countries of 
the repatriated (Shagari 2001, 331), but it is most likely that 
this money never reached the victims. The government was 
overwhelmed by events running out of its control (ibid.).
Repatriations were constant, creating a lasting trauma among 
Ghanaians. They tried to take as many of their belongings as 
they could gather. The Ghanaians were an epitome of humili-
ation and violence against foreigners. One can observe three 
types of violence in this unequal confrontation between indi-
viduals and state apparatus. Firstly, there was the disarray of 
long-settled migrants who were suddenly forced to pack their 
belongings, without an option of judicial appeal. Many, 
incredulous at first, ended up pleading, in vain, for an exten-
sion of the three-month deadline.9 Some who had ongoing 
activities and contracts, were afraid of losing everything. O. 
Stephen, a tailor from Ghana, complained: “I have paid a 
year’s rent in advance to my landlord in Ibadan. Because of 
the agreement entered into, I cannot get it back from him 
again.”10 Stephen was also under pressure from his clients, 
because “since the Federal government’s order a few days 
[earlier], a number of customers have besieged his shop 
forcibly demanding their clothes.”11 Another form of violence 
lies in the modalities of waiting and evacuation at the make-
shift camps set up at airports, for the luckiest, the borders 
with Benin or the Apapa port for others:
They arrived in hundreds and thousands, from all the nooks 
and corners of the country where they lived. They landed at 
Apapa inside trippers, the kind of transport not used in carry-
ing human beings in Nigeria but for transporting goods and 
animals – cows to be precise.12
Travellers waiting for transportation were treated as social 
outcasts, also in transit countries on their way to Ghana, 
Benin and Togo.13 They suffered inextricable dehumani-
sation and appeared more than ever as stateless persons. By 
15 February 1983, at the peak of the expulsion exercise, 
about one and half million foreigners had officially left the 
country: 700,000 Ghanaians, 180,000 Nigeriens, 120,000 
Cameroonians, 150,000 Chadians, 5,000 Togolese, 5,000 
Beninese, “and a host of others.”14 According to Minister for 
Internal Affairs Alhaji Ali Baba, Ghanaians, Togolese and 
Nigeriens had been the aliens most involved in criminal 
and malicious acts in Lagos for over three years.15 He was 
silent about the role of Nigerian citizens, thus suggesting 
that criminality was an imported phenomenon. According 
to Ali Baba, there was a national reduction in crime of 
about 60 percent during the expulsions.16 In the fight 
against unemployment, the departure of Ghanaian teachers 
also released teaching positions in Lagos state, as remarked 
by a state executive, Dr Olawal Idriss:
Defending the employment of the illegal immigrants in the first 
place, Mr. Idriss said that the State Schools Management Board 
had been forced to take on qualified Ghanaian teachers because 
at that time, Nigerian graduates were unwilling to accept teach-
ing jobs. “But right now”, he added “there are many of them who 
have been interviewed and are on the waiting list ready to work.17
7 “Refugees”, Sunday Sketch, January 30, 1983.
8 “Airlines, Airlift Aliens”, Daily Times, February 3, 
1983.
9 Tunji Adedigba, “Aliens Ask for More Time”, Sun-
day Sketch, January 23, 1983.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 “Agony of Waiting for the Black Star Line”, Sun-
day Concord, January 30, 1983.
13 “Benin, Nigeria: Border closed”, Sunday Sketch, 
January 23, 1983.
14 Wole Odunaike, “1.5m Illegal Aliens Gone 
Home”, Daily Times, February 15, 1983.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Tunji Adedigba, “Aliens Ask for More Time”, Sun-
day Sketch, January 23, 1983.
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The public expression of rejection was focusing on Gha-
naians. It is pertinent to draw a comparison here with the 
Malians, who were less visible but well integrated through 
longstanding cultural and economic ties. From 1970 to 
1984, the number of legal Malians increased from 85,000 
to 113,000,18 compared to Nigeriens, Chadians or Came-
roonians and Ghanaians, who were the elites of migrants 
due to their professional qualifications. Most of the 
Malians residing at Lagos were security guards, artisans, 
carriers or hawkers. The Yorubas in Lagos, who were better 
educated and trained, alongside migrants from the Eastern 
Nigeria, had abandoned these sectors (Sada and Adegbola 
1976, 192). Quite different from Ghanaians of Fanti or 
Yoruba cultures, the Malians were not in direct occupa-
tional competition with Nigerians from the South. The 
Malian migratory model differs from that of Ghanaians, 
who were brought to Nigeria by the British authorities as 
clerks. At least since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
young herdsmen or farmers had moved freely between 
Timbuktu and Lagos, where they either worked or sold 
their livestock for kola nuts or imported goods before 
returning to their place of origin. In the course of the 
travel and according to the opportunities, the baragnini or 
“job-seekers” (in the Bamana or Bambara language) 
(Gary-Tounkara 2008, 179) looked for the quickest poss-
ible ways to reconvert to petty-trading, a very popular 
activity that gave substantial income. Most of them were 
Songhai, Tuaregs, Fulanis or Dagons, alongside Bambaras, 
Malinkes and Soninkes. In the countries to the south of 
Mali, from Côte d’Ivoire to Nigeria, this seasonal 
migration also occurred towards the riverine areas. As 
such, the equivalent of baragninis in Kano were referred to 
as cin rani (Mahadi and Inikori 1994, 67) or as those who 
“eat in dry season” in the Hausa language. In 1959, the 
geographer Mansell Prothero recorded the mobility of cin 
rani in Sokoto state, as well as peddlers of kola in Western 
Nigeria and Gold Coast, alongside migrants from Niger 
and other French territories.19 According to Prothero, the 
number of migrants from French colonies settled in 
Sokoto state increased by 250,000 between 1931 and 1952 
(1959, 8). In the remaining parts of the North, one could 
observe a movement of peasants to and from cities in 
search of paid work, like Chadians sojourning in Maidu-
guri in Borno State where they were either house-helps or 
artisans. Some of these migrants, from different origins, 
continued their journey towards southern cities, such as 
Ibadan where they came together in quarters initially 
reserved for migrants, the sabo (Fourchard 2009, 195).20 In 
Lagos, the quarters of Ajegunle, Agege, Yaba, Obalande and 
Lagos Island have high concentrations of migrants from 
the Nigerian Sahel and Francophones: “The low-income 
northerners consist chiefly of livestock dealers. Among 
them were also kola nut traders in Agege who settled in 
kola growing and collecting centres of the metropolis” 
(Sada and Adegbola 1976, 196–97). Because of this close 
interaction within sabo, reinforced by historical, cultural 
and symbolic ties, Malians were often confused with the 
Nigerian Hausa-Fulani.21
To add to the confusion, Nigeria had no system of national 
identity cards (Matthews 2002, 53), unlike their Francoph-
one neighbours that had inherited an overbearing spirit of 
administrative control from the colonial authorities. It was 
therefore not so easy to identify undocumented Malians. 
The situation was the same in the places of departure of 
migrants because of the inefficiency of the civil registration 
system. The irony of history was that in some cases, as that 
of Shugaba, as we will see later, the court had used the colo-
nial-era criteria for individual identification. Thus, in 1980, 
to establish the Chadian ascendance of Shugaba at Maidu-
guri, Alhaji Maitama Yusuf, the then Minister of Internal 
Affairs, brought a retired Chadian of Banana (or Masa) ori-
gin to testify. The latter affirmed that the mother of Shu-
gaba was Chadian because she had a pierced tongue and 
pulled out teeth, tribal marks peculiar to the Bananas of 
pastoral tradition:
18 Census of Nigeria, 1970–84 ; Federal Ministry of 
Labor, International Labor Statistics, Lagos, 
1970–1980, quoted by Arthur, 1991: 74.
19 Mansell Prothero was one of the proponents of 
the theory of push and pull of migrations, en vogue 
in the academic circle between the 1950s and 1970s. 
L. A. Kosinski and R. M. Prothero, eds., People on the 
Move: Studies on Internal Migration (London, 
Methuen: 1974).
20 “In Ibadan, the density of migrants is 
undoubtedly much greater in the districts of Sabon 
Gari and Mokola, where the Hausa, Nupe and other 
Northern peoples live, than in the other parts of the 
town” (Prothero 1959, 44).
21 Interview with Oumar Maiga, a Malian born in 
Abidjan in 1971, dealer in semi-precious stones, Iba-
dan, 26 November 2012.
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Three years prior to the expulsion of undocumented aliens, 
these methods of identification already underscored the 
inadequacies of some state services and the repressive 
strategy of the president with regard to his opponents. As it 
were, Malians did not consider themselves strangers in 
Nigeria, or Nizeriya in Bamana language, even though the 
situation changed at the beginning of 1983. Abdoulaye 
Dabo, a transnational seller based in Ibadan, was transpor-
ting cloths when the order for expulsion came:
I was at Mokwa [Niger State] that day. I was coming from Lomé 
on my way to Kano. Ha! That was serious. Because when I had 
heard that, I was with my luggage. I needed to go to Kano and 
sell. I sold my goods: I came to Mokwa. I learnt at Mokwa that 
no one could cross [the border] with money because there were 
policemen fighting immigration…23
Abdoulaye reacted in order to avoid having to carry liquid 
cash. He bought aluminium there at Mokwa, which he 
resold at Parakou in the Republic of Benin. Unlike thou-
sands of his fellow citizens, according to available statistics, 
he escaped the expulsion.24 As for Abdoulaye and others 
like him, they got no support either from the Malian gov-
ernment, nor from its consulates. From Parakou, he 
travelled to Lomé to wait for the situation in Nigeria to 
calm down. He later returned to Ibadan and settled in sabo. 
In practice, the whole operation of identification, regroup-
ing and expulsion of the undocumented turned out to be 
chaotic because the immigration service and the police 
were unprepared and there was no coordination with the 
migrants’ states of origin. People neither had the time to be 
regularised nor to prepare for their sudden departure. Des-
pite the chaotic situation, a number of foreigners escaped 
being expelled with the help of Nigerian neighbours or 
friends. Some got their papers by marrying a Nigerian 
woman, others sought the support of their employers to 
obtain legal status.25 Some others, finally, were probably 
hidden and protected by their neighbours.
2. Between Nationalist Vengeance and Domestically Driven Political 
Calculation
How does one interpret the expulsion of foreigners from 
the rest of the Community, Chad and Cameroon? What 
were its consequences in Nigeria’s relationship with neigh-
bouring countries? The matter quickly acquired a political 
dimension at both the international and local levels, but 
with different effects according to the nature of bilateral 
relations with the undocumented migrants’ countries of ori-
gin. Concerning the Ghanaians, this will be shown further 
in this section. The eviction of foreigners isolated Nigeria 
within the Community, because it sent a negative signal 
concerning the regional integration policy, in which Nigeria 
was seeking to play an important role. The neighbouring 
states criticised the violation of the protocol on free move-
ment of persons, which had been approved just three years 
earlier in the bid to set up the Community (Afoyolan 1988, 
5). Little appreciated by Shagari, Liberian President Samuel 
Doe, stated that Nigeria could incite reciprocal expulsions: 
“We are concerned about the plight of those displaced West 
Africans and the repercussion it would have on millions of 
Nigerians living outside their country, many of whom are 
doing so illegally.”26 Firmly in control of Ghana since the 
coup of 1981, Jerry Rawlings, another rival of Shagari, called 
on his fellow citizens to return to Ghana in order to build 
an egalitarian society.27 However, some Ghanaians preferred 
to go to Côte d’Ivoire, the richest country in Francophone 
She had both her lips pierced and those holes were visible to any-
one looking at her. Also as a Banana woman, two of her teeth in 
the lower jaws had been removed (Ajayi 1981, 46).22
22 For more details about this group, read: Dumas-
Champion, Françoise. 1983. Les Masa du Tchad. 
Bétail et société. Paris: Maison des sciences de 
l’homme.
23 Interview of 24 November 2012 at Ibadan. 
Abdoulaye is the president of Malians in Oyo State, 
attached to the Council of Malians in Nigeria with 
its headquarters at Lagos. Among his duties, he takes 
care of the relations between the members of his 
community and their neighbours and authorities.
24 “Les expulsions de Maliens en Afrique”, Jamana 
[Bamako], July–October 1987, 59. This number was 
probably underestimated. The counting of border 
crossing of persons on the frontiers of Upper Volta 
is broken down as follows: 1048 persons for the seg-
ment of Koro-Bankass, 254 for Tominian-
Mandiakuy, 26 at Koury. Through Niger Republic, 
92 and 5, 313 persons crossed through the posts of 
Ménaka and Labézanga respectively. Archives of the 
Ministry of Territorial and Local Government 
Administration (AMATCL), a reflection on the 
problem of refugees and the turning back of citizens 
by other countries, September 1983.
25 “Aliens Resort to Deals to Stay Put in Nigeria”, 
Sunday Concord, January 23, 1983.
26 “Nigerians in Ghana Advised”, Sunday Concord, 
February 6, 1983.
27 Ibid.
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West Africa and the major host country of Malians, or try-
ing their luck again in Nigeria once the tension calmed 
down.28 The media publicity of the conditions of arrival of 
the repatriated shaped the reaction in the Francophone 
countries. The Republic of Benin protested against the 
influx of Ghanaians at its eastern borders and bemoaned 
the saturation of public intervention system. In Mali, the 
government remained discreet; the arrivals were taking 
place in the regional peripheries of Gao and Timbuktu. 
Criticised by African public opinion, Nigeria lost credibility 
in its role as the locomotive of the Community.
The expulsion of foreigners from Nigeria sparked off criti-
cism from Western Europe. Pope John Paul II was deeply 
touched.29 In the United Kingdom, the leader of the 
opposition, Michael Foot, denounced the expulsions.30 This 
criticism did not go down well with a section of Nigerians, 
including those opposing the expulsion, who underlined 
the historical responsibility the United Kingdom in draw-
ing the borders and, therefore, dividing African peoples, 
brothers and cousins whose political destiny diverged on 
the account of colonialism.31 Faced with such a scale of 
protest, Nigerian diplomats were having a hard time 
remaking the image of the country in the international 
community.32 They took cover behind the law: the repat-
riated had neither documents nor legal status and shifted 
responsibility for the situation to the bad will of the state of 
origin in receiving their citizens. The three million people 
(the largest expulsion in Africa) represented a negligible 
proportion of the Nigerian population, but this was not the 
case for the countries of origin (Okafor and Mac-Anigboro 
1990, 59). The power relations imposed by Nigeria on its 
neighbours were untenable.
In Nigerian society, there was heated public debate between 
proponents and opponents of the expulsions: “The 
Nigerians received the news of the expulsion of aliens with 
mixed feelings. Some felt happy over it, others unhappy. 
Some showed pity for the aliens, others were lukewarm, 
and those who employed illegal aliens bemoaned the col-
lapse of their business.”33 Supporters adopted the official 
posture, with financial considerations in mind. They saw 
themselves neither as nationalists nor as selfish, because 
Nigeria remained the biggest contributor to the institutions 
of the Community (Afolayan 1988, 15). And the slowdown 
of economic activity affected them first. In these con-
ditions, they felt that national resources derived from oil 
production should benefit Nigerian citizens and not the 
Community via foreigners residing in the country, and who 
had no papers. It was as though, within the framework of 
the Community, Shagari had adopted the popular formula 
of Margaret Thatcher against the European Economic 
Community in 1979: “I want my money back!” This posi-
tion calls to mind that of Côte d’Ivoire under Félix Hou-
pouët-Boigny in 1958, when French West African (AOF) 
colonies obtained internal autonomy within the Franco-
African Community. Côte d’Ivoire, where there were many 
migrant workers from the rest of AOF (from Upper-Volta 
and from French Sudan mainly), successfully opposed the 
retaining of a federal political structure desired by Senegal 
and French Sudan. It wanted to prevent a federal political 
entity from accessing its own commercial profits. One of 
the results of this decision was an exacerbation of national-
ism and the expulsion of Dahomeans and Togolese, and a 
minority of Ghanaians and Nigerians of Yoruba origin, 
mistakenly identified as Dahomeans (Gary-Tounkara 2008, 
130). In 1960, AOF disappeared, to the satisfaction of Côte 
d’Ivoire and France. Later, in 1975, France expressed its res-
ervations on the creation of the Community under the aus-
pices of Nigeria, whose influence in its former colonies it 
wanted to curtail (Adesina 2007, 40).
From the perspective of score-settling, some Nigerians 
regarded the expulsion as a response to the expulsion of 
their fellow citizens from Ghana in 1969 (Afolayan 1988, 
19). ). This was a sentiment that was shared by the Gha-
28 Soji Ajayi, “Second Coming of Aliens”, Sunday 
Sketch, June 26, 1983.
29 Kayode Soyinka, “Expulsion of Aliens: Nigerians 
Diplomats Fumble Abroad”, Sunday Concord, Feb-
ruary 13, 1983.
30 Ibid.
31 Ola Balogun, “Illegal Aliens Issue: Pandering to 
Mob Xenophobia”, Sunday Concord, January 30, 
1983.
32 Kayode Soyinka, “Expulsion of Aliens: Nigerians 
Diplomats Fumble Abroad”, Sunday Concord, Feb-
ruary 13, 1983.
33 “Reactions: Mixed Feelings”, Sunday Concord, 
January 30, 1983.
IJCV: Vol. 9 (1) 2015, pp. 25 – 38
Daouda Gary-Tounkara: A reappraisal of the expulsion of illegal immigrants from Nigeria in 1983  34
naians suffering in transit camps, as was widely carried by 
the press: “Although the general feeling among Ghanaians 
was that Nigeria was retaliating for what happened to its 
citizens thirteen years previously in Ghana, when the Busia 
regime sent them packing, their main anger – specially as 
the days dragged slowly by, leaving them still waiting at the 
harbours and airports – was against their government and 
leader, Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings, whom some described, with dis-
gust, as ‘an idiot,’ ‘a soldier who does not behave like one,’ 
and a ‘coward’.” 34 In 1969, Nigerians living in Ghana for 
several generations had been deported in brutal and dehu-
manising conditions (Olaniyi 2008, 12, 19). They returned 
to a country that they hardly knew and that was in the heat 
of a civil war, which Ghana had contributed indirectly to 
sustaining by according temporary recognition to the 
secessionist Republic of Biafra. Possessing strong academic, 
cultural and entrepreneurial capital, the repatriated were 
able to settle down or socially integrate. The economic 
growth that oil production stimulated from 1973 and the 
active support of the local authorities of Lagos and the 
Western State facilitated their reintegration.35 Nevertheless, 
the sudden return of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969 was 
deeply engraved in the collective memory, and one of the 
interpretations of the 1983 expulsion was that Nigeria had 
taken its revenge on its historical rival. This major factor, 
from a psychological perspective, represents a desire to 
settle scores with the Ghanaian rival as an expression of 
nationalist vengeance. This took the form of a triple sanc-
tion: to remind Ghana of the pain of having to suddenly 
take care of one’s citizens, to exacerbate Ghana’s political 
difficulties, and to cut to size a country that was considered 
presumptuous and had since 1957 proclaimed itself the 
representative of sub-Saharan Africa. Shagari, conscious of 
this latent feeling of humiliation, made use of it to send a 
message to his own army, some of whom might have been 
inspired by the charismatic model of Rawlings (Philippe 
1983, 120). Subsequent events proved that he was not com-
pletely wrong as he was overthrown by General Buhari in 
December 1983, plunging Nigeria into a long period of 
military regimes.
On the other hand, a portion of public opinion, intellec-
tuals and opponents of the government, criticised the 
expulsion. The condemnation were based on four points: 
the difficulty in identifying and differentiating foreigners 
from citizens, the breakdown of diplomatic relations, the 
diversion strategy of the president, and the reactivation of 
internal opposition among Nigerians, between indigenes 
and non-indigenes, which could weaken the new unity of 
the country. For the NPP of Dr. Azikiwe, on which the 
peoples of the Middle Belt – Anambara, Imo and Plateau 
States – placed their hopes during the general elections of 
1979 (Joseph 1981, 31), Shagari pointed to foreigners 
because he needed scapegoats to make people forget the 
failure of the fight against unemployment (Afolayan 1988, 
19), an argument that was relayed in Western Europe.36 
Alhaji Shugaba Darman, a leader of the GNPP, the domi-
nant party in the House of Representatives of both Gon-
gola and Borno states, underlined the risk of retaliation on 
Nigerian emigrants and the difficulty identifying foreigners 
in Borno, a border state to Niger Republic, Chad and 
Cameroon: 
The deportation order would cause a lot of problems in Borno 
since it would not be easy to identify the aliens in certain parts 
of the state, especially at the border. He advised that caution 
should be exercised to avoid wrong deportation especially of 
Nigerians who do not have identity cards.37
Shugaba was talking with facts because he had been 
unjustly expelled to Chad three years earlier (Ajayi 1981). 
34  May Ezekiel and Michael Awoyinfa, “Exodus: 
Ghanaians Go Home”, Sunday Concord, January 30, 
1983.
35 “A leading example of the deported entrepre-
neurs from Ghana was Chief David Adebayo Amao 
Alta who was honoured with the title of Babalaje 
(leader of business tycoons) of Ogbomosoland in 
recognition of his commercial contributions. He was 
a successful businessman and pioneer of manufac-
turing industries in Ogbomoso whose conglomerate 
employed over 10,000 workers and agents between 
the 1970s and 1990s. He was educated at C.M.S 
Central School, Onisha and Commerce College, 
Kumasi Ghana. After his deportation from Ghana, 
where he had spent twenty-four years, Amo Alta 
served as co-founder of the union in Ogbomoso” 
(Olaniyi 2008, 25).
36 “In the Western world many believed that the 
quit order on foreigners was motivated by political 
considerations. They believed the action was timed 
for an election year as a vote-catching stunt by an 
incumbent government which has suffered criticism 
at home especially on corruption and mounting 
unemployment.” Kayode Soyinka, “Expulsion of 
Aliens: Nigerians Diplomats Fumble Abroad”, Sun-
day Concord, 13 February 1983.
37 “Shugaba Warns on Deportation Order”, Sunday 
Sketch, January 30, 1983.
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On 24 January 1980, the Minister of Internal Affairs 
accused him of being a Chadian and of having planned the 
assassination of members of the NPN of President Shagari 
in Borno State with the help of Chadian migrant workers. 
The GNPP representative was summarily expelled to a 
country that was in the middle of a civil war: Chad. 
Though his passport had been taken from him, he man-
aged to get back to Maiduguri via Cameroon on 13 March, 
and argued his case at a judicial proceeding instituted 
under public pressure by the President. Shugaba won the 
case and got back his full rights as a Nigerian citizen. The 
case had been organised by the leaders of NPN of Borno, as 
stated by Justice Patrick Chukwuma Akpamgbo during his 
judgement in Maiduguri on 25 July.
The applicant belongs to the GNPP according to his evidence 
and he is the Leader of the House. The NPN is their rival 
according to the evidence before me in this state and applicant’s 
counsel has asked me to take judicial notice which I shall take 
that the 1st respondent, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the 
3rd respondent His Excellency the President of Federal Repub-
lic also belong to the NPN the ruling party at the Federal level 
in Lagos. I cannot in this case before me rule out political victi-
misation from the evidence before me as I have reviewed that it 
was this political victimisation that led to the deportation of the 
applicant who has been in parties since 1951 starting with 
NEPU then NPC. The mother said that the applicant went to 
Mecca with Sardauna as she put it. (Ajayi 1981, 156–57)
One can make an instructive comparison with the use of 
Ivoirity in Côte d’Ivoire in the case of Alassane Dramane 
Ouattara, which occurred a decade later (Gary-Tounkara 
2010). Considered as a Burkinabe, Head of State Henri 
Konan Bédié prevented him from standing in presidential 
elections from 1995. In Côte d’Ivoire, although foreigners 
had had the right to vote in elections from 1960 to 1994, 
the two Dramanes were accused of not belonging to any 
national group. They were called upon to prove their iden-
tity, including bringing material proof of their maternal 
links – which led to a DNA test being conducted on the 
mother of Ouattara. In 2010, after contesting an election 
with the outgoing president, Laurent Gbagbo, Ouattara 
finally became president with the help of France and the 
UN. Meanwhile, the country had undergone a long period 
of uncertainty as the doubt on Ouattara’s origin insidiously 
extended to his real and supposed loyalists: the Dioula of 
the northern part of the country as well as Burkinabes and 
Malians. In protest at the political and administrative 
exclusion that ensued, a part of the army rebelled against 
President Gbagbo, and the country was divided into two 
from 2002 to 2010 (Soro 2005).
Among the intellectual critics was the writer and film-
maker Ola Balogun, of Yoruba origin. He drew attention to 
the populist and xenophobic mobilisation of the president: 
“the much touted expulsion order is no more than the des-
perate play of a leadership that is incapable of proposing 
any serious solutions to the current economic crisis in the 
country.”38 Now, the president himself traced his ancient 
roots to the Fulani journey from Senegal to Sokoto, prelude 
to the theocratic revolution of Usman Dan Fodio (2001, 2). 
In the same way, on the eve of the colonial occupation, the 
father of Shugaba, born at Chigina in the southeast of pres-
ent day Chad, had been recruited into the army of Sultan 
Gauramgama (Ajayi 1981, 81). The formidable conqueror 
Rebah defeated him in 1893, and he took refuge near the 
borders of Chad. The Baghirmi (father of Shugaba) then 
settled at Maiduguri in 1911 and married the mother of 
Shugaba, a Kanuri woman. Ola Balogun explained that the 
nature of African boundaries and the existence of trans-
border communities implied a flexible management of 
international migration. According to him, neither 
Nigerian authorities nor those of neighbouring countries 
respected the rights of citizens to acquire a passport, which 
thwarted efforts to regularise illegal immigration. He asked 
a crucial question: after the mass repatriation of foreigners 
today: Whose turn will it be tomorrow? What if the indi-
genes of different Nigerian states followed the example of 
Shagari, but against non-indigenes, on the pretext that they 
are foreigners to the state? After the anti-Ibo riot of Kano 
in 1953 and the exodus of refugees during the civil war of 
1967 to 1970 (Falola and Okpeh 2008), was Shagari not 
opening Pandora’s box? Balogun queried thus:
38 Ola Balogun, “Illegal Alien Issue: Pandering to 
Mob Xenophobia”, Sunday Concord, January 30, 
1983.
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To preserve national unity and confer equal rights on 
citizens, Nigeria reached an initial consensus by affirming 
the federal character of national and regional institutions 
and the principle of full citizenship in the state of origin. 
This was a legacy of the British administration that had 
defined the categories of indigenes and non-indigenes at a 
particular moment and based on political criteria; the law 
has continued to wrongly define the indigene. This paved 
way for new conflicts on the problematic category of 
strangers. Qualified as “scissiparous federalism” (Bach 1988, 
22), the multiplication of states was intended to prevent the 
supremacy of Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo groups. But it 
actually perpetuated this supremacy insofar as it shifted 
tensions over access between indigenes and non-indigenes 
to economic resources at the local level.
For the Malians, the expulsion was seen as nationalist ven-
geance in reaction to the expulsion of Nigerians from 
Ghana in 1969, a sort of jealousy towards Ghanaian mana-
gerial staff and a political manoeuvre by the president. 
Moussa Tounkara, a former baragnini, now a seller of semi-
precious stones in Lagos, described the tension and the 
confusion that were in the air at the time of expulsion:
Anyway, people, they talked a lot. Some said that it wasn’t every-
body, [it was for] the Ghanaians, some others, they said that 
Shagari [said] that it is the Ghanaians, they must go back to 
Ghana. Others, they say that it is for foreigners. But what I told 
you, at that time, in Nigeria, there [was] a lot of brutality: every-
body [was] afraid. That is why everybody, they started to leave, 
but we, we didn’t leave [the country]40.
In other words, the authorities were targeting foreigners, 
particularly the Ghanaians, even though that was officially 
denied. The testimony of Moussa Cissé, also a seller at Idu-
mota, was rather more explicit:
Cissé, who also escaped the expulsion, believes that the 
president, campaigning for re-election in August 1983, sus-
pected Ghanaians of serving as a disguised electoral reserve 
for the opposition, and expelled all the foreigners so as not 
to reveal his political manoeuvre. Among other things, the 
GNPP of Shugaba, the NPP of Dr Azikiwe and the Unity 
Party of Nigeria of Chief Obafemi Awolowo had formed a 
coalition against the NPN: the Progressive Parties Alliance 
(Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 78). Awolowo, Shagari’s main 
rival, depended especially on the electoral support of 
citizens of Yoruba extraction (Joseph 1981, 30). A rumour 
circulated that the opposition was intending to have 
foreigners register and vote fraudulently, especially Gha-
naians and Yoruba (Gravil 1985, 528). This explanation, 
surprising a priori, cannot be neglected given the weight of 
ethnic affiliation in Nigerian political culture and the fact 
that one could mistake a Ghanaian for a Nigerian from the 
West, and a Nigerien, a Malian or a Chadian for a northern 
Nigerian. On transnational communities, Balogun pointed 
out the historical and cultural proximity of some Nigerians 
with the illegal immigrants expelled by Shagari:
In the end, there is no escaping the fact that in the overwhel-
ming majority of cases, we are not dealing with a faceless entity 
known as “illegal aliens”, but with our own kith and kin from 
other African countries, even if the circumstances of colonial 
partition of African countries have conferred different nominal 
nationalities on us for the present.
What is the real difference between a Yoruba man from Benin 
Republic and a Yoruba man from Nigeria, or a Hausa man from 
Nigeria and his cousin from Niger Republic? Does a Fulbe pas-
toralist from the north of Cameroun Republic have different 
blood in his veins from the Fulani herdsman in Sokoto?
Do we fully realize the consequences of attempting to make 
each African state an island unto itself? And how much more 
time will elapse before each of the 19 states of the federation of 
Nigeria (or 9 or 65, if the advocates of state creation have their 
way), enacts a law requiring non-indigenes of each state to 
return their states of origin?39
What all of us understood was that there were foreigners who 
voted against Shagari. When Shagari became president, it was to 
be revoted [sic, reelected…]. Some people say other things, 
which is [sic] not the same, that is possible. But what we all fol-
lowed [understood] was that […] that is to say, there were cases, 
for example, if you arrive at zone [a place, an area], you can’t say 
the names of people [target them directly]; all the strangers 
should be chased away, at the same time. Otherwise, Malians are 
not conscious enough in these zones, as were the Ghanaians, the 
Beninese and Yorubas.41
39 Ibid.
40 Interview, November 2012, Lagos.
41 Interview, 1 December 2012, Lagos.
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After the political conspiracy against Shugaba, this rumour 
continued to fuel an atmosphere of generalised suspicion 
against foreigners at the end of Shagari era. Without being 
said openly, the expulsion of foreigners in general, and 
Ghanaians in particular, was aimed at depriving Awolowo 
of a part of his supposed electoral base. Another event had 
contributed to questioning the place of foreigners in socio-
political life: the Maitatsine riot in Kano in December 1980. 
This social mobilisation of poor Northern youths, mostly 
Nigerians, under the guise of religious demands, was led by 
Muhammadu Marwa, a preacher of Cameroonian origin. It 
turned into a rebel movement composed of foreigners, who 
were arrested, tried, convicted and expelled to Cameroon, 
Chad, Niger and Mali (Usman 1987, 77–80). The political 
and media handling of the Maitatsine and Shugaba cases 
by the president therefore contributed in forging a preju-
dice or feeling that foreigners were a threat to the security 
of the country and its leaders at the regional level. In a 
tense pre-electoral context, they equally appeared as riggers 
who were trying, with the supposed help of the opposition, 
to influence the choice of citizens by registering illegally to 
vote. Considering the aftermath of the events of Kano and 
the expulsion of Shugaba, the persons interviewed in the 
course of this research drew a link between the expulsion 
of 1983 and what happened three years earlier.43 Be that as 
it may, economic crisis and unemployment found a fertile 
ground for the public expression of xenophobia.
3. Conclusion
Quite brutal in its formulation and implementation, the 
expulsion of illegal foreign immigrants from the rest of the 
Community, Cameroon and Chad left an enduring mark in 
the national consciousness and the local languages. Rein-
terpreted in the context of post-expulsion, the popular 
expression “Ghana-must-go” is a proof of this event: since 
1983, it refers to the type of bag used by people to transport 
goods and materials, alluding to the Ghanaians who fled 
hurriedly from the country, having only bags as luggage.
Beyond being a classical response of a government battling 
with heavy social effects of economic crisis, the expulsion 
also reveals another less obvious fact: the use of the 
foreigner label by President Shagari in trying to disqualify 
his political opponents or to generate public support. In 
1980, in the wake of his election, he caused the deportation 
of Shugaba, accused of being a Chadian and of having 
planned the assassination of a representative of his party in 
Borno. The legal action instituted to clarify facts decided 
that it was a government conspiracy and rehabilitated Shu-
gaba, who had succeed in coming back to Maiduguri. In 
1983, on the eve of a presidential election accompanied by 
crisis, the expulsion of foreigners emanates from another 
government strategy, which caused a rumour to circulate 
that the opposition was planning to make foreigners vote 
illegally, especially those of Yoruba origin like Ghanaians. 
This throws more light on the expulsion of 1983, which 
simultaneously symbolised a confrontation by proxy 
between the president and Chief Awolowo, his major rival. 
The xenophobic mobilisation thus crystallised on Gha-
naians. In a political society and culture that is still char-
acterised by the weight of clientelism and ethnic 
affiliations, as well as transnational social links, the expul-
sion is regarded as the double response of the president: 
chase away foreigners from the national labour market on 
one hand, and on the other, weaken the supposed electoral 
base of his rival. This is not only explained by the number 
or the social position of Ghanaians but also by the internal 
political stakes that appear on nationalist and identity ter-
rain, thus creating suspicion against opponents and “bad” 
foreigners. In its nationalist dimension, the eviction of 
Even more to the point, does the villager from Ogoja necessarily 
have more in common with his fellow Nigerian citizen from 
Bornu than with a Fanti tribesman from Ghana, beyond he 
accident of their having found themselves together or not 
within the confines of a colonial entity administered as a single 
unit by Great Britain? 42
42 Ola Balogun, “Illegal Alien Issue: Pandering to 
Mob Xenophobia”, Sunday Concord, January 30, 
1983.
43 I thank Patrick Oloko for putting me on this 
track.
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Ghanaians from Nigeria also meant retaliation for the 
expulsion of Nigerians residing in Ghana in 1969.
The Head of State, who had tried to rebrand his image by 
expelling illegal foreigners, precipitated his own fall 
because he was not able to improve the economic situation, 
which led to the return of the army to power. Despite the 
context of crisis, migrants represented a useful and sought-
after source of labour to Nigerian entrepreneurs and 
employers, especially in the informal sector, hence the 
return of migrant workers. In 1985, this time on the initi-
ative of Buhari, half a million illegal residents were expelled 
again from the country.
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